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COMMON LAW TORT DEFENSES UNDER CERCLA
INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")' was Congress' first systematic attempt
to deal with the environmental problems created by hazardous waste dis-
posal.2 CERCLA was designed as a comprehensive response to the
problems caused by the leaking,3 often abandoned and largely unregu-
lated hazardous waste dumps scattered throughout the nation.4 The Act
established procedures by which the government would respond to
hazardous waste spills5 and created a "Superfund" to pay for that re-
sponse.6 It also fashioned a cause of action designed to make "responsi-
ble parties"7 pay for the clean up of such spills.' Subsection 9607(a) of
1. The major provisions of CERCLA are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
The section numbers in Title 42 have corresponding numbers in the Act, i.e. 9601 corre-
sponds with 101. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA) is the latest amendment to CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. IV 1986)
codify the major provisions of SARA. For a short legislative history of CERCLA, see
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COL. J. ENV. L. 1 (1982) (hereinafter Grad).
For a legislative history of SARA, see Atkeson, An Annotated Legislative History of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 ENV. L. REP.
10363 (Dec. 1986).
2. Several statutes have isolated provisions relating to hazardous wastes, including
the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et. seq.), Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et.
seq.), Toxic Substance Control Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et. seq.) and the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et. seq.).
3. CERCLA was meant to address contamination caused by hazardous wastes leak-
ing from improperly maintained disposal facilities into the surrounding environment. See
Grad, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Id. at 8-13 (discussing the committee report for S. 1480, the original Senate bill).
In at least one case, defendants argued that CERCLA was meant to apply only to aban-
doned facilities. See Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong World Industries, 669 F.
Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (The court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982)
suggests that CERCLA applies to both active and abandoned facilities and rejected de-
fendants arguments); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) & (iii) (Supp. IV 1986) (retain-
ing the references to both active and abandoned facilities).
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9602-9606.
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9633 (1982). SARA repealed these sections and reenacted
them as part of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Supp. IV 1986).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) ("responsible person"); United States
v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) ("responsible
parties").
8. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (E.D.
Pa. 1982). CERCLA's term for these "responsible parties" is "covered persons." See
infra note 9. Courts applying the common law concept of public nuisance developed an
analogous "pay as you go" concept to deal with situations where the economic benefits of
the nuisance outweigh the harm caused, but the nuisance is nevertheless causing injury.
See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 218, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970). The concept has been applied to common law strict liability torts as well. See
infra note 77. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) defines the other CERCLA
cause of action which is designed to allow the United States to respond quickly to "immi-
nent hazards."
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CERCLA defines this liability. It provides that, "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set
forth in subsection (b) of this section," 9 certain entities"° shall be
liable for response costs" and damages for injury to natural resources' 2
associated with the release or threatened release' 3 of hazardous sub-
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 9607 is styled "Liability," and sub-
section (a) is styled inter alia "Covered persons; scope".
10. These entities (referred to as "covered persons") are:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed
of,
(3) any person who... arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
* at any facility ... containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
The terms "owner or operator," "vessel," "facility," "hazardous substance," "dispo-
sal," "treatment," "transport," "release," and "response" are terms defined in § 9601, the
Act's dictionary section.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) and (B) (Supp. IV 1986). Response costs include
not only "removal costs," the immediate costs associated with cleaning up the release of a
hazardous substance (including monitoring and assessment costs), but also "remedial
costs," the costs of long term remedies like capping and storage. See id. § 9601(23), (24)
and (25)(Paragraph (25) defines response as "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial
action." Paragraphs (23) and (24) define "remove or removal" and "remedy or remedial
action" respectively). Compare T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp.
696, 705-707 (D.N.J. 1988) (discussing response costs with reference to § 9601(23), (24),
and (25)) with Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (comprehe-
sive definition of "necessary costs of response" is "somewhat elusive"). CERCLA consist-
ently differentiates between the concepts of removal and remedial action. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(23) & (24) (Supp. IV 1986); id. § 9604(a)(2)("Any removal action undertaken...
under this subsection ... should to the extent .. practicable, contribute to the efficient
performance of any long term remedial action with respect to the release or threatened
release concerned." (emphasis added)); id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)("all costs of removal or reme-
dial action"); id § 9613(g)(2)("An initial action for recovery of [costs under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607] must be commenced- (A) for a removal action.., and (B) for a remedial action
.... "). But see Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1105-
1106 (N.D. II1. 1988). The court held that 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) (Supp. IV 1986),
"explicitly mandates, as a prerequisite to [cost recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 9607], EPA
approval of [potentially responsible party] response in situations where the EPA has initi-
ated an investigation of the site." (emphasis added). However, § 9622(e)(6), by its terms,
applies only to unauthorized "remedial action." Some of the costs alleged appear to be
associated with "removal" action, for instance, "the disposal of removed material." Dis-
allowance of these costs appears to be based on the erroneous notion that remedial action
and response are interchangeable terms.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (Supp. IV 1986). Damages include "reasonable
costs of assessing" the resulting injury.
13. As defined by subsection 9601(22) "release" excludes employee exposure solely
within the workplace when the employee sues the employer, emissions from engine ex-
haust, nuclear wastes covered by other statutes, and the normal application of fertilizer.
In the case of a threatened release, response costs must be incurred before liability ac-
crues. See infra note 79. There is no comprehensive definition of "threatened release" in
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stances.' 4 The subsection (b) defenses are an act of God, 5 an act of
war 16 and, under certain circumstances, an act or omission of a third
party.'" Although these provisions of the statute relating to defenses ap-
pear straightforward, many courts have been unsure about what defenses
may be asserted in a cost recovery action under CERCLA.' 8
The clauses "notwithstanding any other provision of law" and "subject
only to the defenses [of] subsection (b)" qualify the scope of the sentence.
Read literally, this language suggests that cost recovery actions are not
subject to "other provisions of law," and that defenses other than those
listed in subsection (b) may not be interposed in such actions. However,
many courts have ignored this "normal and natural" reading of these
clauses. '9 These courts call CERCLA ambiguous20 and, noting its sparse
legislative history, proceed to give the clauses a variety of interpreta-
the cases, and few cases attempt to supply a definition. Cf United States v. Northernaire
Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 747 (W.D. Mich. 1987) ("The evidence of the presence of
hazardous substances at the facility, when combined with the evidence of the unwilling-
ness of any party to assert control over the substances, amounts to a threat of release.").
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. IV 1986) defines hazardous substances by reference,
referring to 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9062, 42 U.S.C. § 6921, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7412, and 15 U.S.C. § 2606, sections which list, designate, or
otherwise provide for a mechanism for identifying hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9602 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) authorizes the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency to designate by regulation, other hazardous substances. Oil and natural
gas are explicitly excluded from the definition of hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (Supp. IV 1986).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (Supp. IV 1986) (defining an act of God). See also United
States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987)(defendant failed to make
out a proper "act of God" defense).
16. CERCLA does not define "act of war" nor has any court had occasion to pass on
this term.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982); infra note 39. In addition, a person may only
invoke these defenses if "the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the
damages resulting therefrom were caused solely" by the enumerated intervening forces.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982); infra note 38.
18. See infra notes 23-28.
19. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz.
1984),aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898
(D.N.H. 1985); State ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See also
Moore & Kowalski, When is One Generator Liablefor Another's Waste?, 33 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 93, 104, n.67 (1984), which argues that section 311 of the Clean Water Act (33
U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1982)) while similarly worded, has not been construed as delimiting
defenses. The authors also argue that in listing certain defenses, "Congress was providing
exceptions to liability under Section 107(a) where liability might otherwise have been im-
posed under common law."(emphasis added). Id. However, since the enumerated de-
fenses are a subset of the common law defenses to a strict liability tort, this seems
unlikely.
20. See Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 902 ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notori-
ety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative his-
tory."); Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 1142; Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Mottolo); United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986).
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tions.21 Courts have especially objected to the second clause's narrow
circumscription of defenses available to a cost recovery action.22
This Note examines the defense clause and the judicial interpretations
which have given it meaning. Part I proposes an interpretation that does
not strain the language of the statute, and resolves the question of
whether the enumerated defenses are exclusive. Part II suggests an ana-
lytical framework within which one can better understand CERCLA
cost recovery actions.
I. THE RESTRICTIVE LANGUAGE OF SUBSECTION 9607(A):
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Plaintiffs have often urged courts to apply the prefatory clauses of sub-
section 9607(a) in a literal, even mechanical fashion.23 When determin-
ing whether "subject only to the defenses . . ." is exclusive language,
courts have searched for ways to avoid the harshness of such interpreta-
tions.24 Some courts have acknowledged the clause's literal meaning but
21. CERCLA was passed at the end of 1980, at the end of a "lame duck" session.
There were many floor changes in the final version of the Act and none of the earlier
committee reports reflected the Act as finally passed. See United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982). Courts and commentators
have therefore considered the comments and debate surrounding the bill's final passage as
persuasive as any of the reports. This dual perception of CERCLA as a hastily drafted
statute with an inconclusive legislative history has daunted at least one court. See United
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (court must depend on legisla-
tive history "unusually riddled by selfserving and contradictory statements" to interpret
ambiguous statute). This view of CERCLA as a difficult statute to interpret may also
account for some of the curious constructions courts have proposed. See, e.g., Reilly Tar,
546 F. Supp. at 1118 (holding "notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law" pro-
hibits the application of other sections of CERCLA to § 9607, even though
§ 9601(22)(D) explicitly excludes "the normal application of fertilizer" from the term
"release" of a hazardous substance); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp.
1285 (D. Minn. 1987) (engrafting an "accountability for the disposal of hazardous
wastes" requirement in private party cost recovery actions).
22. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 n.9 (D. Ariz.
1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I.
1986) (citing Mardan).
23. See, e.g., Mardan, 600 F. Supp. at 1056; State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.
Supp. 1300, 1305 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1078 (1st Cir. 1986).
24. Many cases have had no occasion to decide whether the defenses set forth in
subsection (b) are the only defenses a defendant may raise, since defendant's case turned
on an enumerated defense, most often an act or omission of a third party. See Washing-
ton v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988); United States v. Northernaire
Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987); United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). Other courts avoid deciding the issue of
exclusivity by finding that the defenses raised have no substantive merit. See United
States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Md. 1986) (discarding the defenses of
laches and estoppel); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1407-1408
(D.N.H. 1985) (discarding an estoppel defense).
It should be noted that at least one court has granted a motion to strike defenses,
including equitable defenses, on the basis that they are not listed in § 9607(b). See United
States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061-1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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have found ways to blunt harsh results.25 Other courts have rejected its
restrictive tenor and have simply refused to apply the clause.26 State ex.
rel. Brown v. Georgeoff,27 is perhaps the most interesting of the cases that
have found ways to evade the exclusive language of the defense clause,28
and Mardan Corp. v. C. G. C. Music, Ltd. ,29 is the progenitor of a line of
cases that has rejected its restrictive effect.3°
A. State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff
The court in State ex re. Brown v. Georgeoff looked to the substantive
basis of a section 9607 action and deemed it a strict liability tort action.31
It therefore accepted defendant's argument that causation continued to
be a part of the liability analysis.32 In particular, defendants argued that
since an independent intervening cause negates causation in a strict lia-
bility tort, such a cause could be pleaded as a "defense" in a section 9607
action.33 In the court's analysis, an intervening cause was not a defense
within the meaning of subsection 9607(b). Instead, it was an occurrence
that negated the causation element of the cause of action.34
The court in Georgeoff was correct in characterizing a cost recovery
action as a strict liability tort.3- However, it overlooked the fact that
25. Some courts recite the § 9607(b) defenses, declare them exclusive, then hear issues
labeled defenses which do not fit the statutory categories. See Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. at
451 (court considered "affirmative defenses" of statute of limitations, laches and estoppel
even though "CERCLA imposes strict liability... subject only to the very limited de-
fenses enumerated in [42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982)]").
26. See infra note 30.
27. 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
28. Other cases dismiss for failure to state a cause of action on dubious grounds. See
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D. N.J. 1983) (government's section
9607 action dismissed because no cleanup undertaken at date of complaint even though
actual release occurred); Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp.
1437, 1450-1451 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (plaintiff failed to state a claim because costs incurred
were not consistent with the National Contingency Plan and because response costs had
not been incurred, again, even though an actual release occurred). Still other courts hear
non § 9607(b) defenses even while recognizing the exclusive language of the defense
clause. See supra note 25.
29. 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (1986).
30. Id.; United States v. Hardage, 116 F. R. D. 460 (W.D. Okla. 1987); Violet v.
Picill, 648 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1986); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898
(D.N.H. 1985).
31. 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
32. Id. at 1305. The main issue in Georgeoff was whether CERCLA applied retroac-
tively. In this context, the Justice department made the argument that because a release
was a continuing nuisance, the transporters' failure to cleanup constituted present con-
duct, and therefore there was no question of retroactive application. Id. at 1304. In sup-
port of their contention that CERCLA was being applied to them retroactively, the
transporters argued that independent intervening causes would discharge any liability
based on their pre-CERCLA conduct. Id. at 1305.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1306. The court also decided that § 9607 sounded in strict liability, not
nuisance.
.35. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
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subsection 9607(b) defenses are a subset of the class of independent inter-
vening causes, the traditional strict liability tort defenses.36 An act of
God, act of war, or act or omission of a third person, are "causes" that
are independent of the defendant and that intervene to negate causa-
tion.37 The statute further restricts these listed defenses in several ways.
First, the release of hazardous material must be caused solely by one or
more of these causes.38 Second, the third party defense is very closely
defined.39 Finally, other subsections which qualify the liability defined in
subsection 9607(a) are very narrowly drawn.' Thus, while the Georgeoff
court correctly noted that intervening causes are defenses to strict liabil-
ity torts, it erred in failing to note that subsection 9607(b) restricts a
party's defenses to a narrow subclass of such independent intervening
causes.
36. This seems strange since the court discussed the transporters' argument concern-
ing third party intervening causes, one of the enumerated defenses in subsection 9607(b).
Intervening causes are also called superceding or supervening causes. See W.P. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER).
PROSSER tells us that the question is not one of causation at all, but rather whether the
harm and the intervening cause were within the foreseeable risk created by defendant's
conduct. PROSSER at 312-313.
37. See PROSSER, supra note 36, at 563-564. Prosser does not mention acts of war
specifically, but it is clear that they are in the nature of "unforeseeable intervening
forces," as are acts of God and independent acts of third persons.
38. The court in United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., had occasion to
discuss this requirement. 680 F. Supp, 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). The court noted that Occi-
dental Chem. Corp. could not assert the third party defense set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(3) (1982), because its "disposal practices were at least partially responsible for
the release or threatened release" at Love Canal. Id at 558; see also O'Neil v. Picillo, 682
F. Supp. 706, 728 (D.R.I. 1988) ("The defendants must demonstrate ... that 'a totally
unrelated thirdparty is the sole cause of the release.' "). It may be that "solely" is used
merely to emphasize the strictness of the common law standard. See Derdiarian v. Felix
Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169(1980) ("Where the acts of a third person intervene between defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury.... liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or
foreseeable consequence of... defendant's negligence (citations omitted)."). However, at
common law an independent intervening cause did not have to be the sole cause of the
harm. See Ventricelli v. Kinney System Rent A Car, 45 N.Y.2d 950, 952, 383 N.E.2d
1149, 1150, 411 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (1978) (although Kinney's negligence caused plaintiff
to be standing behind his parked car, co-defendant's act of striking plaintiff was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injuries).
See also Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1293 (D.R.I. 1986) ("solely" narrows
§ 9607(b) defenses which "essentially serve to shift the burden of proof of causation to
the defendants" which in turn serves to "encourage defendants to mark and dispose of
their hazardous wastes with the greatest care").
39. Parties with whom defendant has contracted do not.qualify as third parties under
this exception. Moreover, even if the third party is a complete stranger, defendant must
have "exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances" and he must have
taken "precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(3).
40. See text discussion infra at notes 47-50.
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B. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.
In contrast to Georgeoff, the Mardan court's analysis attacked the ex-
clusivity language directly, claiming that a literal reading would produce
ridiculous results. In Mardan, plaintiff Mardan Corp. ("Mardan") ar-
gued that the defenses set forth in subsection (b) are the only defenses to
a cost recovery action under CERCLA. Since subsection (b) sets forth
neither release nor unclean hands as a defense, Mardan moved to strike
them.4' According to the district court, Mardan's interpretation would
make defendants liable despite having made payment in a previous cost
recovery action, since the statute lists neither res judicata, payment 2 nor
accord and satisfaction as defenses. The court felt that such reasoning
would also bar such defenses as statute of limitations, waiver and laches,
and found this result ridiculous.43
The Mardan court's analysis ignores the plain meaning of the statute
as well as CERCLA's broad purpose-to assure the clean-up of hazard-
ous waste sites." The language of subsection 9607(a), "subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b)" is clearly restrictive. The adverb
"only" modifies the verb "subject [to]," which means that subsection
9607(b) defenses are the only defenses to a CERCLA cost recovery ac-
tion. Other internal cues bolster this reading. Subsection 9607(a) goes
on to read "[a covered person] shall be liable," mandatory language
which suggests that subsection (b) defenses are exclusive. The narrow-
ness of the third party defense45 also suggests that courts should honor
the restrictive tenor of "subject only."'4 6
CERCLA sections which refer to subsections (a) and (b) further rein-
force this construction. They evidence an intent to make as many parties
as possible liable for payment of cleanup costs. For instance, subsection
9607(e) invalidates any attempt to transfer liability under subsection
9607(a) by idemnification or other "hold harmless" agreements.4 7 Sub-
41. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 n.9 (D. Ariz.
1984), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). Unclean hands is inequita-
ble conduct with respect to the transaction upon which suit is based which will bar equi-
table relief. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 26 (2d
ed. 1948). Since "unclean hands" is for the protection for the court, it can be raised sua
sponte. Id. at p. 60 n.56.
42. As defined in CALAMARI & PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2nd ed. 1977),
payment "is a delivery of money or its equivalent in specific property or services by one
from whom it is due to another person to whom it is due." (citation omitted) Id. at 777.
43. Id.
44. See Wall v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
statute was designed primarily to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites
by placing the ultimate financial responsiblity for cleanup on those responsible for the
hazardous wastes.").
45. See supra notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text.
46. "Subject only" like "solely" suggests a restrictive intent.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1982). The use of the word "transfer" is significant because
9607(e) doesn't bar making these agreements, or enforcing them against the signatory
parties. It does prohibit raising such agreements against parties suing under section
9607(a) who were not parties to the proffered agreement. Cf Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C.
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section 9608(c) authorizes the assertion of a cost recovery claim directly
against a guarantor.4" Finally, although subsection 9608(d) limits the
liability of a guarantor acting in good faith,49 it explicitly provides that
the subsection does not alter the liability of any person under subsection
9607(a).5" Mardan's interpretation is inconsistent with this effort to as-
sure cost recovery since it would allow a prospective defendant many
more defenses to a section 9607 action than the words of the statute
provide.
Moreover, rejecting the Mardan analysis does not necessarily produce
ridiculous results. Subsection 9607(b) discharges the liability of a de-
fendant who is "otherwise liable."'" Therefore, subsection (b) addresses
defendants who meet the substantive liability criteria set forth in subsec-
tion (a).52 Thus, the defense clause does not bar defendant from proving
that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action under 9607(a).53
Other "Mardan defenses" are procedural rather than substantive and
are therefore not defenses as CERCLA employs that term. 4 Res judi-
Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986) (such agreements between private par-
ties "cannot prejudice the right of the government to recover cleanup or closure costs").
It is unclear whether indemnity and release agreements may also be raised against a party
in privity with a party to such an agreement.
48. Prior to the passage of SARA in 1986, the guarantor could assert only those
defenses which the owner or operator had unless the owner/operator's misconduct was
willful. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c) (1982). SARA left the liability of guarantors of "vessels"
unchanged. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9608(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). However, with respect to "facili-
ties" direct action is now restricted to cases where the guaranteed party is insolvent or
jurisdiction cannot be obtained over a covered person who is "likely to be solvent at the
time of judgment." In addition, the guarantor can raise any defense she had against the
owner or operator. Id. § 9608(c)(2).
49. A guarantor remains liable at common law for bad faith. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(d)(2)
(Supp. IV 1986).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9608(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) ("Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed, interpreted, or applied to diminish the liability of any person under section
9607 of this title or other applicable law."). This means that even if the guarantor is sued
directly, the guaranteed party is still subject to suit.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
52. See supra note 9.
53. This can be done by showing that the party has never been an owner or operator
of a vessel or facility, never contracted for the disposal or treatment of hazardous sub-
stances or transported to and selected the sites for such substances, or the party can show
that there has been no release, and no threatened release which has caused response costs,
of any of its hazardous substances. See United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1311
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (In order to escape liability, "defendants... bear the burden of showing
that the hazardous substances at the site came solely from a third party."); Jersey City
Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Industries, 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1259-1261 (D.N.J. 1987)
(The court found that PPG was not a covered person under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) because
it had never owned the site from which there was a release, nor had it arranged for
transport of or transported wastes to the site, nor was it the owner of the wastes when
they were disposed at the site.).54. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982), enumerates defenses which are substantive; they ad-
dress the causation element of the underlying tort, and negate plaintiff's prima facie
showing of liability. Procedural defenses are reasons why the court should not hear the
case even given plaintiff's prima facie showing of liability. Still other "defenses" only
concern the amount of damages which should be assessed. See United States v. Stringfel-
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cata" and collateral estoppel56 are not defenses since they concern the
court's authority to hear the case or particular issue, not defendant's lia-
bility."' The statute of limitations provision of subsection 9612(d) also
addresses procedure rather than substance.
8
Subsection 9607(e) covers the "defenses" of waiver, release, and in-
demnification. 9 That subsection invalidates any purported transfer of
subsection 9607(a) liability, but does not prohibit such agreements.6 0
This means that non-contracting parties seeking recovery are not bound
by such agreements even though they may have effect between the con-
tracting parties.61 Of course, because liability may not be transferred, a
waiver, release, indemnification or other such hold harmless agreement is
not a substantive "defense" in the sense that subsection (b) defenses are;
the agreement and not CERCLA liability is at issue.62 In Mardan, the
defendants, C.G.C. Music, Ltd. and Macmillan Inc., invoked the release
that Mardan had signed.63  The Ninth Circuit held that the release
low, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ("[C]omparative fault, contributory negli-
gence .... and set-off are not defenses to liability, although they may be relevant factors
to consider with respect to damages.").
55. Because each release of hazardous wastes (or potential release which incurs re-
sponse costs) is deemed a separate cause of action, res judicata would seem to have little
significance in the typical case.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(e) (1982), limits the collateral estoppel effect of decisions in
CERCLA cases to other CERCLA actions. A plaintiff losing a CERCLA action would
therefore not be collaterally estopped from suing again under state law, for example. By
the same token, a winning plaintiff could not assert a CERCLA judgment to foreclose
defenses to a similar non CERCLA action.
57. See supra note 54 and infra note 58.
58. Since 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), merely bars the presentation
of a claim, but doesn't render it void, this statute of limitations would be considered
procedural under traditional common law principles. Cf Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Co., Ltd., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955). In any case, limitations periods are always proce-
dural in the sense that the passage of time can only be justification for not hearing the
case, not justification for the act or omission creating liability.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1982).
60. Paragraph (1) of subsection 9607(e) states that no "indemnification, hold harm-
less, or similar agreement or conveyance" can transfer liability from a covered person to
any other person. Paragraph (2) states that nothing "in this subchapter including the
provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection," bars a covered person from enforcing
such an agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) and (2) (1982).
61. Thus, in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., "Defendants' remain liable to the
state or federal government in an action based upon Section 107(a)(4)(A)" because
neither government body was a party to the release between Mardan and defendant. 600
F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
62. Given that the agreement is being raised, this "defense" is not substantive in the
sense that subsection (b) defenses are. See notes 54 and 58 supra. The same is true of an
accord and satisfaction defense. An accord (agreement to discharge an obligation) which
has been satisfied is raised in defense. See Harrison v. Gooden, 439 F.2d 1070, 1072 (1st
Cir. 1971).
63. Mardan, 600 F. Supp. at 1058. This "defense" of waiver, indemnification or re-
lease can be thought of as a counterclaim for breach of the waiver, indemnification or
release agreement. Several cases have dealt with this grounds for dismissal. See, e.g.,
FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987); Chemical
Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong World Industries, 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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barred Mardan's cost recovery action. 64
Thus, we see that while neither the Mardan nor the Georgeoff analysis
adequately explains the "subject only to the defenses . . ." language of
subsection 9607(a), a careful analysis of the text in the context of the
whole statute does. In Mardan, the court also characterized a cost recov-
ery action as equitable, since it was restitutionary in nature, and reasoned
that equitable relief was always subject to equitable defenses.65 The ques-
tion of equitable defenses 66 should therefore be addressed.
II. PLAINTIFF IN A SECTION 9607 COST RECOVERY ACTION
"WAIVES THE TORT AND SUES IN QUASI-CONTRACT":
IMPLICATIONS
Courts have often characterized the CERCLA cost recovery remedy
as restitutionary.6' These courts in turn characterize restitution as an
equitable remedy, making a cost recovery action an action in equity, sub-
ject to equitable defenses. 68 At least one recent article has taken issue
with the latter categorization.69 Because the standard of liability under
section 9607 is strict liability, 70 courts have also analyzed cost recovery
actions in tort terms. The common law concept of waiving the tort and
suing in quasi-contract integrates these apparently disparate views. 71
64. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1457.
65. Mardan, 600 F. Supp. at 1057-1058. The Ninth Circuit did not reach this ques-
tion. However, the court observed in a footnote that "most district courts that have faced
the issue have interpreted section 107 of CERCLA to impose, as a matter of federal law,
joint and several liability with a correlative right of contribution." Mardan, 804 F.2d at
1457 n.3.
66. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text. Of course, unless Congress ex-
pressly limits federal court jurisdiction (see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868)), a
party can always raise constitutional defenses. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 792
F.2d 372 (3rd Cir. 1986) (third party defendant State prevailed using eleventh amend-
ment argument).
67. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz.
1984),aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986); Sunnen Products Co. v. Chemtech Industries,
Inc., 658 F. Supp. 276, 278 n.3 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (citing Mardan); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F.
Supp. 1283, 1294 (D.R.I. 1986) (citing cases); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898,
909 (D.N.H. 1985). The concept of restitution is defined in general terms as the restora-
tion of unjust enrichment. See Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937) ("A person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other.").
68. See supra note 67. The equity characterization also serves to bar jury trials. See
United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D. Md. 1986); Mottolo, 605 F. Supp.
at 913.
69. Seng, The Quasi Contractual Nature of Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 5
VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES 85 (1985) (herinafter Seng). Ms. Seng argues that cost recovery
actions are restitutionary actions at law.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. IV 1986), defines liability as "the standard of liability
which obtains under section 1321 of Title 33." Courts have construed the standard of
liability under 33 U.S.C. § 1321 as strict liability. See, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564
F.2d 964, 982 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
71. At common law, the victim of certain torts could sue in and obtain the remedies
available in assumpsit. See D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 238-239
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This conceptualization of a cost recovery action explains the structure of
subsection 9607(a), 72 and explains why a defendant may not assert equi-
table defenses to a cost recovery action."
A. A CERCLA Action Is Based in Tort
The basis of a cost recovery action under section 9607, is the occur-
rence of a tort.74 Like all torts, liability under section 9607 is based on an
act or omission causing harm or injury.7" As is the case in other ul-
trahazardous activities, 76 liability is strict.7 7 Engaging in the business of
creating, storing or disposing of hazardous wastes is itself the act which
confers liability for subsequent harm.7" The release of a hazardous sub-
stance, or a threatened release that results in actual clean-up costs79 are
(1973) (hereinafter DOBBS). Compare Seng, supra note 69, at 92-96. Ms. Seng notes that
the cost remedy of a 9607 action is typical of an action in quasi-contract. The typical tort
remedy is damages. Ms. Seng rejects the notion that a 9607 action is one in tort for
several reasons in addition to the atypical nature of its remedy. She asserts that unlike
tort actions, a 9607 action "does not accrue upon the completion of a defendant's acts,
but upon the completion of plaintiff's acts." Ms. Seng also maintains that neither causa-
tion nor "defendant's breach of duty" are elements of a 9607 cause of action, although
both are elements of any traditional tort. Id. at 88-92. It is this writer's position that Ms.
Seng is mistaken about when a 9607 action accrues, that elements of causation are a part
of a cost recovery action, and that defendant's breach of duty is implicit in the strict
liability standard. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
72. See infra note 75-91 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
74. In purely formalistic terms, waiving the tort and suing in quasi-contract would
mean waiving the tort remedy as well. Thus, CERCLA's damages remedy (subpara-
graph 9607(a)(4)(C)) is technically troublesome. There are at least two possible solu-
tions. First, the combination remedy can be characterized as extraordinary relief, noting
that it is only available to government entities. Second, we may posit two distinct torts,
an ultrahazardous activities tort, and a public nuisance tort. Damages for damage, loss
or destruction of public rights is a possible remedy for public nuisance. See State ex. rel.
Dresser Ind., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 792-793 (Mo. 1980). Moreover, many pre-
CERCLA cases characterized the release of hazardous substances as public nuisances.
See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-105 (1972).
75. See PROSSER, supra note 36, at 2. Stressing the difficulty of defining the term tort,
Prosser tentatively defined a tort as "a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for
which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages." Many
torts, however, do share the common elements of defendant's act or omission, legal cau-
sation, and legally cognizable harm or injury.
76. See PROSSER, supra note 36, at 536, 554-555.
77. See PROSSER, supra note 36, at 554-556.
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1),(2),(3) and (4) (Supp. IV 1986), define the classes of liable
people, covering almost any person who might possibly deal in hazardous waste disposal
including, substance generators or transporters, and the contemporaneous owners or op-
erators of facilities where substances were stored. However, transporters are only liable if
they decide where the hazardous wastes will be delivered. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
79. Subsection 9607(a)(4) confers liability on inter alia, "any person who accepts...
hazardous substances for transport to... facilities. . . , from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance
.... .(emphasis added).
The "threatened release" phrase in the quoted passage is clearly parenthetical. But see
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 n.18 (2d Cir. 1985) (calling the
passage gramatically clumsy and ambiguous). Both the threatened release which has
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the harmful or injurious events for which a party is liable. From these
events flow liability for all damages80 to natural resources,"' all the cost
of government clean-up eff6rts, and all the clean-up costs incurred by
third persons.s2 It is implicit in this structure that these "responsible
parties" by their acts or omissions, caused the "release or threatened
release."83
caused the incurrence of response costs and the bare release of a hazardous substance will
trigger liability. Ms. Seng as well as the courts have assumed that the incurrence of
response costs was the event which triggered liability. See Seng, supra note 69, at 88; see
also United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D.N.J. 1983); Bulk Distribution
Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1450-1451 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Brewer v.
Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); cf Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at
1044 n. 18 (statute is ambiguous about whether "there is liability from a release without
the incurrence of 'response costs' ").
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(6) (Supp. IV 1986), defines damages as "damages for injury or
loss of natural resources as set forth in section 9607(a) or 9611 (b) of this title."
81. Clearly, damage to natural resources can occur in the absence of any response
efforts.
82. These costs must be necessary and consistent with the National Contingency
Plan. Courts have construed this remedy more narrowly than that of subparagraph
9607(a)(4)(A), but no court has undertaken an extensive discussion of necessary costs.
See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 405 (W.D. Mo.
1985)(The term necessary "has received scant attention in CERCLA litigation."); cf
N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986) (On a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a cause of action, the allegation by plaintiff that "he was required
by state and local agencies to incur the response costs that he seeks to recover" is suffi-
cient to show the costs were "necessary."). For a discussion of consistent as opposed to
not inconsistent, see United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPPACO),
579 F. Supp. 823, 850-851 (D. Minn. 1984),rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); infra note 91.
83. Owner/operators cause releases by owning or operating a facility. A release or
threatened release would not occur "but for" a "subsequent landowner's" (i.e., present
owner ignorant of past disposal) failure to conduct an environmental audit. 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9601(35)(A) (Supp. IV 1986) tends to support this proposition. That subsection defines
"contractual relationship" so that the "innocent landowner" who purchases without
knowledge of the presence of hazardous wastes on the property can assert the third party
defense. However, if at the time of purchase, the buyer would have been alerted to the
presence of hazardous wastes by any "appropriate inquiry," the defense is unavailable.
See Id. §§ 9601(35)(A),(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
Transporters also satisfy "but for" causality. Transporters are factually related to re-
leases when hazardous wastes which they have transported have been released. Perhaps
because they function more as conduits than other responsible parties, transporters are
only liable when they select the facility to which they convey wastes. 42 U.S.C.§ 9607(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
Finally, generators of hazardous wastes are factually related to the release of their
wastes since but for their production, the wastes could not be released. The more difficult
question arises when there is no showing that defendant's wastes have been released.
Causation as an element of a 9607 action was discussed in United States v. Bliss, where
the court opined that a generator might defend a 9607 action by showing that its particu-
lar wastes had not been released even though similar wastes had been. 667 F. Supp. 1298,
1310 (E.D. Mo. 1987). According to the court, this showing would take defendant
outside the category of "covered person." Id.
This is at odds with the language of section 9607(a)(4) which speaks of liability based
on the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(3),(4) (Supp. IV 1986); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1270,
1276 (D. Del. 1986); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983). It
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Another indication of the tort character of a 9607 action is the nature
of the subsection (b) defenses. They are independent intervening cause
defenses, the only ones available to tortfeasors under common law for-
mulations of strict liability.8 4 Thus, a tort, the act of dumping hazardous
wastes which are later released, is the underlying wrong for which sub-
section 9607(a)"5 provides a remedy.
B. The Cost Recovery Remedy is Quasi-Contractual
At common law the victim of a tort could waive the tort and sue in
quasi-contract.8 6 The common count of quantum meruit, s7 the reason-
able value of the services rendered, is analogous to the cost recovery rem-
edy of subsection 9607(a).8 ' In a cost recovery action defendant is liable
is unclear that CERCLA should be read to impose liability even when defendant has
shown that there is no causal relationship between its wastes and the release or
threatened release. In any case, the logical implication from the structure of section
9607(a) is that causation is presumed when a party fits a category of "covered person."
Causation refers to whether defendant's activities in some sense caused the release or
threatened release, not whether the release or threatened release caused the response
costs. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Con-
gress specifically rejected including a causation requirement" when it deleted from the
liability provision "any person who caused or contributed to the release or threatened
release," and substituted "classes of persons without reference to [causation]."); see also
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd,
851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (missing this distinction).
84. See PROSSER, supra note 36, at 559-565
85. Amendments to CERCLA have provided for recovery by the government of the
costs "of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under [42 U.S.C. §
9604(i)]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (Supp. IV 1986). The provision was added be-
cause the "reasonable costs of assessing" language of subparagraph (C) did not appear to
cover such studies.
86. See DOBBS, supra note 71, at 239. Dobbs gives two reasons for the persistence of
this "waiver of tort" idea, first to manipulate the statute of limitations, and second to get
the benefit of quasi-contractual remedies. See United States v. C & R Trucking Co., 537
F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (N.D. W.Va. 1982) (Action to recover costs under 33 U.S.C. § 1321
is quasi-contractual and subject to the six year contract statute of limitations.); Interform
Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978) (Recovery for trespass to chattels would
have been minimal, but under quantum meruit plaintiff recovered the rental value of the
forms.); cf Manhattan Egg Co. v. Seaboard Terminal & R. Co., 137 Misc. 14, 242 N.Y.S.
189 (City Ct. N.Y. 1929) (conversion counterclaim could not be interposed in contract
action but quasi-contractual claim could). Something of this spirit is reflected in an old
couplet:
"Thoughts much too deep for tears subdue the Court
When I assumpsit, bring and god-like waive the tort."
Adolphus, The Circuiteers, an Ecologue, 1 L.Q. REV. 232, 233 (1885).
87. "The law of quasi-contract ... developed in a group of very specific factual pat-
terns [that] became so standardized that they acquired names as special versions of the
general assumpsit form. These subordinate categories of assumpsit were called the com-
mon counts." See DOBBS, supra note 71, at 236-238.
88. While the measure of recovery in a section 9607 action is costs, those costs must
be reasonable. For instance, government response must be "not inconsistent with" the
National Contingency Plan. Moreover, private party response must be "consistent with"
the National Contingency Plan and their response costs must be "necessary costs." 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A),(B). See NEPPACO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 851 (D. Minn. 1984),rev'd
in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987)
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for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred," subject to certain
restrictions.8 9 This is exactly the type of implied contract for services
rendered to defendant that quantum meruit would create.90 As in all
quasi-contractual actions, only reasonable costs are recoverable.9 '
From a policy perspective, creating a quasi-contractual remedy for this
"tort action" is very sensible for at least two reasons. First, the waiver
of the tort prevents CERCLA actions from being bogged down in the
complex task of determining the nature, extent92 and cause of plaintiff's
injury.93 Second, making costs recoverable encourages private clean-up
efforts,94 minimizing the drain on government funds."
(Costs of government action taken "in harmony with" the National Contingency Plan are
presumed reasonable.); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp.
1100, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
89. See supra note 88. The term incurred has not been discussed much. Some courts
seem to assume that the term includes costs to be incurred. See United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting this distinction and suggesting that costs
incurred included "amounts for services contracted for but not yet performed"). Other
courts have invoked their power to render declaratory judgments. See State ex rel.
Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (incurrence of costs is
sufficient to create a "real controversy" between the parties, making declaratory judg-
ment appropriate); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 407-408
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (citing cases).
90. See DOBBS, supra note 71, at 237-238. Dobbs mentions the common wisdom that
while quantum meruit recovery is allowed for unrequested services, it is denied if such
services are rendered "officiously" or "with no expectation of payment." Cf Wade, Res-
titution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1966) (hereinaf-
ter Wade) (arguing that quantum meruit should be subject to a strictly objective test of
intent).
91. It is implicit in the statutory standard that costs must be reasonable. Costs must
be consistent (private party recovery under § 9607(a)(4)(B)), or not inconsistent (govern-
ment recovery under § 9607(a)(4)(A)), with the National Contingency Plan. It is not
clear what the differences between these standards are, but the court in NEPPACO
opined that reasonableness "is conclusively presumed to have been built into the plan"
and therefore, actions "in harmony with the national contingency plan [and] costs in-
curred pursuant to those actions are presumed to be reasonable and therefore recover-
able." 579 F. Supp. 823, 851 (D. Minn. 1984),rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986),cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). That court also suggested that the
difference in wording indicated a difference in the burden of proof. Private plaintiffs are
required to show that the costs incurred are consistent with the National Contingency
Plan, whereas in government cost recovery actions, the "not inconsistent" language
means that defendant has the burden of proof to show that costs were inconsistent. Id. at
850; see also United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1394-1395 (D.N.H.
1985)(defendants had burden of proof of showing costs incurred by government were
inconsistent with National Contingency Plan).
92. This becomes especially important in the hazardous waste context since many of
the effects of a release may not be known or even knowable for many years after a release.
93. Thus, the classic Palsgraf problem is avoided. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (was defendant's conduct the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injury). Personal and personal property injury remedies may also have been ex-
cluded for this reason. In this respect, it should be noted that the original Senate bill
contained a provision for damages for personal injury. See Grad, supra note 1, at 21-22.
94. For instance, the present owner of land on which a release occurs has an interest
in maintaining the value of the land, if only for resale. Without this remedy he might
very well decide not to undertake clean-up since the most he is likely to recover under a
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C. Equitable Defenses May Not Be Asserted Against
A Cost Recovery Action
On a purely formal level, quasi-contractual actions, as actions at law,
are not subject to equitable defenses.96 Even given the modem merger of
law and equity however,97 there exist compelling policy reasons for re-
stricting the use of equitable defenses in CERCLA actions. Most impor-
tantly, cost recovery actions were designed to expedite the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites by assuring that parties who undertake cleanup
recover their costs in a timely fashion.9"
Creating an equitable cause of action subject to equitable defenses
would frustrate this purpose by vastly complicating cost recovery ac-
tions. An equity court must balance the relative burdens and benefits,
the "equities" between the parties.99 This will generally be a complicated
and time consuming task for the court, as well as encourging parties to
raise issues which would otherwise be irrelevant.co Increased complex-
tort theory is the diminution in the value of the land. See Seng, supra note 69, at 93 n.31
& 32. Against this benefit, he would have to offset the cost of cleanup. Thus, his ability
to charge responsible parties for the cleanup costs encourages his cleanup efforts.
95. See, e.g., Reauthorization of Superfund, March 7 and April 2 1985: Hearings on
H.R. 2005 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985) (Statement of Milton J.
Socolar, GAO). The General Accounting Office estimated that federal government
clean-up costs over the next several years might approach 39 billion dollars. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency expected the Superfund's tax provisions to raise "approxi-
mately $5.3 billion [from fiscal year 1986 to fiscal year 1990]." Id. at 79. It seems clear
therefore, that private cost recovery actions were intended to play an essential role in the
clean-up effort. This, especially if courts were to interpret "costs incurred" to mean that
government cleanup costs would have to be incurred before being recoverable because the
Fund would be depleted by current expenditures. But see Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music,
Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Contractual arrangements apportioning
CERCLA liabilities between private 'responsible parties' are essentially tangential to the
enforcement of CERCLA's liability provisions.").
96. See DoBBs, supra note 71, at 45. According to DOBBS, courts of law now give full
effect to the equitable defenses of estoppel and laches, but the same is not true of the
"unclean hands" defense.
97. See DOBBS, supra note 36, at 65.
98. Cf supra note 44. See also Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat. Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1156
n.9 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977) (advancing statutory purpose calls for
rejecting recognition of unclean hands defense).
99. See H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 41, at § 23 ("Equitable relief.., is granted in
the discretion of the court.., by applying established principles of equity to the situation
presented by all the facts in the case, and adapting the remedy to accomplish the most
equitable result possible."); DOBBS, supra note 71, at 52-54; cf Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) ("Where plaintiff and defendant present competing
claims of injury, the traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a 'nice adjustment
and reconciliation' between the competing claims") (citations omitted).
100. Cf O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 726 (D.R.I. 1988) ("By delaying thorny
considerations of equitable apportionment to a later contribution proceeding, the govern-
ment is provided immediate funds after the initial liability hearing to take prompt reme-
dial action at the earliest opportunity."). In United States v. Stringfellow, the court noted
that "the Court's discretion in apportioning damages among the defendants during the
contribution phase does not effect the defendants' liability." 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060
1989]
96 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT [Vol. 1
ity also tends to diminish both plaintiff's and defendant's ability to assess
the probable outcome of litigation.'' Such uncertainty would encourage
defendants to litigate since their liability is restricted to cleanup costs." 2
Finally, unlike most equitable restitutionary remedies, a quasi-contrac-
tual remedy 10 3 gives plaintiffs no interest in particular property of the
defendant;" it is merely a money judgment. 0 5 Thus, since they do not
partake of the advantages of equitable remedies, the cost recovery reme-
dies under subsection 9607(a) should not be subject to their disadvan-
tages--equitable defenses.
CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the language of the defenses clause of subsec-
tion 9607(a) and has attempted to derive a sensible interpretation of its
(C.D. Cal. 1987). Similarly, an unclean hands defense is unrelated to whether defendant
in any way caused a release or threatened release. See supra note 41.
101. See F.R.C.P. 16(c)(10). Rule 16(c)(10) authorizes judicial adoption of "special
procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve com-
plex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems." The
need for such procedures is based on "an awareness that the tensions between an attor-
ney's responsibilities as an advocate and as an officer of the court frequently are aggra-
vated in complex litigation and that the tactics of counsel may waste time and expense if
the judge passively waits until problems have arisen." Manual for Complex Litigation,
Second § 20.1. "Fair and efficient resolution of complex litigation depends upon effective
control and supervision by the court, dedication and professionalism of counsel, and the
collaboration of the judge and the attorneys in developing, implementing, and monitoring
a positive plan for the conduct of pretrial and trial proceedings." Id.
102. F.R.C.P. 11 would not be an effective deterrent in this context. It would be virtu-
ally impossible to show that defending the action was frivolous or in bad faith if a defend-
ant can always argue the "balancing of the equities" in what usually qualifies as multi-
party complex litigation to begin with. For a not untypical cast of parties and claims, see
United States v. Ottati & Goss, 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985) (plaintiffs included
state and federal governments who claimed under CERCLA, RCRA and state statutory
and common law, defendants included generators, owners/ operators and transporters).
103. Ejectment, replevin and detinue are restitutionary remedies at law which would
give plaintiff an interest in specific property, but only if plaintiff could establish that it had
title superior to defendant's in the disputed property. Thus specific restitution at law
would be useless to the plaintiff in possession of the site, and a party out of possession of
the site would not be made whole by recovering the site.
104. Equitable liens and constructive trusts give the plaintiff an interest in the specific
property, something which may be helpful when the defendant is a Chapter 7 debtor.
See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (debtor's obligation to clean up hazardous
waste disposal site under state court injunction is a "claim" dischargeable in bankruptcy).
In Kovacs, since the debtor was the owner/operator, plaintiff would not want to recover
the contaminated real property (although recovery of the cleaned-up property would be
desirable). But, in the case of a prior owner, it may be that assets from a sale of the
property are still traceable and thus recoverable. Cf In re Teltronics, 649 F.2d 1236,
1239 (7th Cir. 1981) ("The rule that property obtained by fraud is not part of the bank-
rupt's estate represents the policy that property should remain in the hands of its rightful
owners no matter how legitimate the claims of creditors."). The imposition of a construc-
tive trust is a determination in equity that the trust beneficiary is the "rightful owner."
105. See DOBBS, supra note 71, at 241 ("Where the quasi-contract plaintiff wins a sim-
ple money judgment, the constructive trust plaintiff wins an in personam order that re-
quires the defendant to transfer specific property in some form to the plaintiff.").
TORT DEFENSES UNDER CER CLA
scope based on the text of the statute, and the common law tradition out
of which it arose." Obviously, a strictly textual interpretation is some-
times not possible or even desirable. 10 7 However, as Justice Frankfurter
wrote, "Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed
statute, one certainly begins there."' °8 A closer adherence to this maxim
would serve to minimize much of the spurious interpretation which has
accompanied CERCLA cost recovery litigation to date.
In particular, when read in their "natural and normal" sense, the pref-
atory clauses of section 107(a) tell us that the defenses of subsection
9607(b) are exclusive. Characterizing subsection 9607(b) defenses as ex-
clusive inevitably leads to an inquiry into the definition of "defenses"
under CERCLA. In an attempt to answer this question this Note has
proposed that a cost recovery action is appropriately characterized as a
strict liability tort with a quasi-contractual remedy. As a consequence,
under traditional remedial theory the section 9607 cause of action would
be at law and therefore not subject to equitable defenses.
Jonathan T Uejio
106. For further background, see Seng, supra note 69, at 92-106; see generally Wade,
supra note 94.
107. Many philosophers would tell us that no text may be interpreted without extrinsic
information. See, e.g., Ingram, Hermeneutics and Truth in HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS
(R. Hollinger 1985).
108. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoL. L. REv. 527
(May 1947). A thorough analysis of the text of the statute should precede appeals to
legislative history. See also United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 901-902 (D.N.H.
1985) ("The general rule of statutory construction ... is to look first to the language of
the statute and then to the legislative history if the statute is unclear.").
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